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Abstract
This paper studies the impact that ethnic innovators have on the global activities of
U.S. ￿rms by analyzing detailed data on patent applications and on the operations of the
foreign a¢ liates of U.S. multinational ￿rms. The results indicate that increases in the share
of a ￿rm￿ s innovation performed by inventors of a particular ethnicity are associated with
increases in the share of that ￿rm￿ s a¢ liate activity in countries related to that ethnicity.
Ethnic innovators also appear to facilitate the disintegration of innovative activity across
borders and to allow U.S. multinationals to form new a¢ liates abroad without the support
of local joint venture partners.
JEL Classi￿cation: F23, J15, O31, O32, O33.
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11 Introduction
Over the last four decades, science and engineering communities in the United States have
become considerably more diverse from an ethnic standpoint. This increased diversity is apparent
in the names of inventors listed on U.S. patent applications. Over the 1975-1982 period, 81.3%
of these names were of Anglo-Saxon origin, but by the 2000-2004 period, this share had fallen
to 68.0%. Much of this shift, and in fact much of the recent growth in the number of U.S. based
scientists and engineers, is a consequence of immigration. In the 2000 Census of Populations,
immigrants constituted 25% and 48% of the U.S. workforce employed in science and engineering
occupations with bachelor￿ s and doctorate educations, respectively.
This paper analyzes the impact ethnic innovators have had on the global operations of U.S.
￿rms by addressing three main questions. First, to what extent do U.S. based innovators of a
particular ethnicity facilitate the expansion of U.S. multinationals in countries associated with
that ethnicity? Second, how do these ethnic innovators in￿ uence the global distribution of the
multinational￿ s research and development (R&D) and patenting activities? Finally, are U.S.
multinationals that employ innovators of a particular ethnicity less dependent on joint venture
partners when forming new a¢ liates in countries associated with that ethnicity?
Ethnic innovators are likely to have several attributes that could help U.S. multinationals
capitalize on foreign opportunities. Innovators of a certain ethnicity typically have knowledge
and experience that are essential for developing products and services targeted at customers
in countries associated with that ethnicity. They are likely to have a strong understanding of
customer behavior there and to have insights about what types of products would face high
levels of demand. Furthermore, ethnic innovators are likely to have language skills and cultural
sensitivity that would promote collaboration with innovators and business developers in host
countries. Ethnic innovators also have skills that might make them more e⁄ective general man-
agers at ￿rms pursuing foreign opportunities, especially those of a technical nature or making
use of internationally distributed R&D e⁄orts. Well-educated individuals of a certain ethnicity
typically possess specialized knowledge about how to conduct business in countries associated
1with that ethnicity. Ethnic innovators are also often part of networks that can foster trust and
support foreign market access. Such relationships are hard to construct yet crucial in many
developed and emerging economies for deal making and business success.
These roles that are potentially played by ethnic innovators appear to be particularly impor-
tant in the kinds of industries that multinationals compete in. Rauch and Trindade (2002) and
others point out the value of ethnic ties in industries producing di⁄erentiated products rather
than commodities and in industries featuring the use of deep tacit knowledge as opposed to
codi￿ed information. Saxenian (2006) stresses the importance of ethnic ties for collaboration
in industries characterized by fragmented production, modular development, and rapid product
cycles. In a report on the Indian Diaspora, the Government of India (2001) notes the role that
Indian Americans have played in promoting foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals in
R&D intensive sectors in particular. Thus, ethnic innovators can reduce the costs of entering
foreign locations and facilitate the subsequent growth and success of operations.1
In order to study these e⁄ects of ethnic innovators, it is particularly useful to work with
data that links individuals of particular ethnicities to speci￿c ￿rms. Such data are drawn from a
variety of sources. In order to characterize the ethnicity of the science and engineering workforce
of ￿rms, the analysis uses a measure based on one type of their output, namely patents. More
speci￿cally, the analysis uses detailed ￿lings from the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce for
all patents granted from 1975-2008. These ￿lings include the names of the inventors of each
patent, their employer, and their location. In order to measure the degree to which innovative
activity is performed by individuals from each of nine ethnic groups, procedures that make use
of commercial databases of ethnic names assign probable ethnicities to innovators. For example,
innovators with the surnames Ming or Yu are assigned a high probability of being of Chinese
ethnicity, while innovators with the surnames Agrawal or Banerjee are assigned a high probability
of being of Indian ethnicity.
1Detailed quanti￿cation of the mechanisms that give rise to the e⁄ects of ethnic ties is sparse. Saxenian et al.
(2002) presents the survey based analysis of ethnic scientists and engineers working in Silicon Valley. More than
half of the respondents are from large companies.
2In order to conduct tests of the relation between ethnic innovation and multinational ￿rm
activity, the analysis links data on inventors to data on the activities of U.S. multinational ￿rms
captured in the 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad con-
ducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data include measures of the activity
of each of the foreign subsidiaries of multinationals with a U.S. parent, including measures of as-
sets, sales, employment, and employment compensation. The BEA data also contain information
on where multinationals perform R&D and the ownership structure of foreign a¢ liates.
Tests that analyze panel data of parent-ethnicity observations reveal that increases in the
share of innovation performed by individuals of a certain ethnicity are associated with increases
in the share of multinational a¢ liate activity in countries of that ethnicity. These tests include
parent-ethnicity ￿xed e⁄ects so that responses are measured o⁄ of time series variation in the
role played by innovators of a speci￿c ethnicity at a speci￿c ￿rm, and they include a ￿xed e⁄ect
for each ethnicity-year to control for trends in the growth of distinct ethnicities. The results of
these tests are particularly pronounced for ￿rms that are likely to place high value on ethnic
innovators in the sense that these ￿rms are beginning to perform innovative activity in the
countries associated with the ethnicity of the innovators.
The results also do not seem to merely capture the possibility that decisions to employ in-
novators of a certain ethnicity and to expand in countries associated with that ethnicity are
jointly determined. Measures of the share of ethnic innovation re￿ ect shares in the years pre-
ceding the measures of a¢ liate activity. Furthermore, results hold in speci￿cations that use a
measure of the predicted extent of ethnic innovation that is computed based on a ￿rm￿ s initial
level of ethnic innovation across U.S. cities and the subsequent growth in ethnic innovation by
city. This approach is similar to the supply-push immigration framework of Card (2001). Taken
together, the results on the relation between the share of innovation performed by an ethnicity
and the share of multinational ￿rm activity in countries associated with that ethnicity indicate
that ethnic innovators play a signi￿cant role in facilitating the expansion of U.S. multinationals
in ethnic regions. The knowledge and cultural sensitivities of these innovators thus appear to be
3valuable in helping multinationals unlock key factors to succeeding in these markets.
The data allow for exploration of where U.S. ￿rms conduct R&D and of the extent to which
U.S. ￿rms engage in foreign R&D that generates patents. Speci￿cations that control for parent-
ethnicity and ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects illustrate that ￿rms with more patents generated by
U.S. based innovators of a particular ethnicity conduct more R&D in the countries associated
with that ethnicity. Similar speci￿cations also reveal that ￿rms with more patents generated by
U.S. based innovators of a particular ethnicity apply for more patents that list inventors based
in countries associated with that ethnicity. These ￿ndings also appear to be robust to many
concerns about reverse causality. Thus, the paper shows that ethnic innovators facilitate the
spread of innovative activity within multinational ￿rms across countries.
Analysis of new a¢ liates reveals that U.S. multinationals are able to own larger shares of new
entities in countries associated with the ethnic heritage of the ￿rms￿ethnic innovators. Linear
probability speci￿cations that include parent-year ￿xed e⁄ects indicate that higher levels of
patenting activity by inventors of a particular ethnicity are associated with higher propensities to
form new a¢ liates as wholly owned or majority owned entities. Similar results are obtained using
the approach based on Card (2001). Previous work indicates that one motivation for the use of
joint ventures is to gain access to a local partner who can provide information about local demand
and customs.2 The ￿ndings in this paper suggest that U.S. based ethnic innovators possess
knowledge and connections that facilitate entry into foreign countries using organizational forms
that leave larger ownership stakes in the hands of the multinational.
These ￿ndings contribute to several literatures by illustrating the role that ￿rms play in
linking ethnic networks, foreign direct investment (FDI), and knowledge di⁄usion. A signi￿cant
body of research documents the e⁄ects of ethnic connections on certain forms of international
economic interaction. Rauch (2001) reviews papers on the economic impact of ethnic networks.
Ethnic networks have been shown to play important roles in promoting international trade,
investment, and cross-border ￿nancing activity, with recent work particularly emphasizing the
2See, for example, Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004).
4role of educated or skilled immigrants.3 Much of this work uses aggregated data and cross-
sectional techniques, so the panel analysis of ￿rm-level data in this paper complements this
literature and identi￿es key mechanisms in these linkages.
Recent work also considers how social and ethnic ties facilitate transfers of technology.4
Individuals who are geographically mobile appear to play a signi￿cant role in these kinds of
transfers.5 Because this paper￿ s ￿ndings illustrate a mechanismby which knowledge is transferred
globally, it also adds to research on the role multinational ￿rms play in the international di⁄usion
of knowledge.6 Finally, the results inform a growing body of work that analyzes ￿rm decisions
about whether to locate innovative activity in a single place or in multiple locations.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details about the
data. Section 3 includes three parts; the ￿rst describes the analysis of how U.S. based ethnic
innovation shapes the share of a multinational￿ s activity in countries associated with that eth-
nicity. The second part describes the analysis of the extent to which ethnic innovators facilitate
the disintegration of innovative activity across borders. The third part presents the examination
of whether ￿rms that employ innovators of a certain ethnicity are less likely to use joint ventures
when they form new a¢ liates in countries associated with that ethnicity. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
This section ￿rst describes the ethnic patenting data developed for U.S. multinational ￿rms.
The second part describes the BEA data on the foreign operations of these ￿rms and the merger
of the two data sources.
3Papers in this literature include Saxenian (1999, 2002, 2006), Arora and Gambardella (2005), Buch, Kleinert,
and Toubal (2006), Kugler and Rapoport (2007, 2011), Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008), Docquier and Lodigiani
(2010), Iriyama, Li, and Madhavan (2010), Huang, Jin, and Qian (2011), Nachum (2011), Hernandez (2011),
Javorcik et al. (2011), and Rangan and Drummond (2011). Related work on trade includes Gould (1994),
Head and Ries (1998), Rauch (1999), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kerr (2009), Rangan and Sengul (2009), and
Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011). Clemens (2009) and Docquier and Rapoport (2011) provide broader reviews.
4Examples of this work include Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale (2006), MacGarvie (2006), Oettl and Agrawal
(2008), Kerr (2008), Papageorgiou and Spilimbergo (2008), and Agrawal et al. (2011).
5For evidence of this point, see Almeida and Kogut (1999), Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003), Nanda and Khanna
(2010), Choudhury (2010), and Hovhannisyan and Keller (2010).
6Papers on this topic include Keller (2004), Veugelers and Cassiman (2004), Singh (2004, 2005, 2007), Mac-
Garvie (2005), Branstetter (2006), Alcacer and Chung (2007), and Nachum, Zaheer, and Gross (2008).
7Work on this topic includes Zhao (2006), Singh (2008), Alcacer and Zhao (2011), and Zhao and Islam (2011).
52.1 Data on Ethnic Innovators
Measures of the ethnicity of innovators employed at U.S. multinational ￿rms are created on the
basis of data on each patent granted by the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce between
January 1975 and May 2008. Hall, Ja⁄e, and Trajtenberg (2001) provide extensive details about
these data, and Griliches (1990) surveys the use of patents as economic indicators of technological
advancement. Each patent lists at least one and often several inventors and includes information
on the location and employer of each inventor. These data are extensive, containing over eight
million inventors and four million granted patents during the sample period. Much of the analysis
below considers the impact of U.S. based innovators, and inventors are classi￿ed as being based
in the U.S. if they are located in a U.S. city. Although the data are selected using a screen
related to the date of patent grants, the date of patent applications is used to identify the timing
of innovative activity.
The ethnicity of inventors is not listed on patents, but it is possible to determine their
probable ethnicity through their names. The matching approach exploits the fact that people
with particular ￿rst names and surnames are likely to be of a certain ethnicity and makes use of
two databases of ethnic names. The ￿rst was developed by the Melissa Data Corporation for use
in direct-mail advertisements and the second by LSDI, also for marketing purposes. The process
a⁄ords the distinction of nine ethnicities: Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, European, Hispanic, Indian,
Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Vietnamese. When there is more than one inventor associated
with a patent, each individual is given an ethnicity assignment and then these are averaged.
The name match rate is 99%. Kerr (2007, 2010) provides details on the matching process, lists
frequent ethnic names, and provides descriptive statistics and quality assurance exercises.
Table 1 displays the share of U.S. based innovation performed by ethnic innovators working
at public companies over the time periods that are analyzed in more detail in Section 3. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the Anglo-Saxon ethnic share declines from 81.3% of U.S. domestic
patents for public ￿rms in the 1975-1982 period to 68.0% in the 2000-2004 period. This declining
share is primarily due to the growth in innovation among Chinese and Indian ethnicities, which
6increase from under 3% to 9.5% and 7.3%, respectively. Ethnic inventors are more concentrated
in high-tech industries than in other industries, and this gap has widened substantially over the
past three decades. Furthermore, while ethnic innovation was particularly prevalent in pharma-
ceuticals and chemicals industries in the 1970s, ethnic contributions to innovation in computers
and electronics industries were particularly prevalent in the 2000s.
The tests below exploit variation within ￿rms in the share of innovation performed by in-
ventors of a certain ethnicity and control for ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects. Therefore, the tests
depend on there being variation in the evolution of ethnic innovation across ￿rms. Figure 1,
which is constructed from the patent database, illustrates that such heterogeneity exists among
seven large U.S. ￿rms that report earning foreign income in Compustat.8 Each line plots the
share of U.S. based innovation that is attributed to Chinese and Indian innovators at one of
seven large ￿rms. As indicated, there is substantial variation in the levels and changes of the
share of innovation performed by Chinese and Indian inventors across ￿rms.
The analysis described below uses data on ethnic innovation aggregated to the ￿rm-ethnicity-
year level. The analysis calls for measures of ethnic innovation that precede the measures of the
outcomes of interest. Therefore, levels and shares of innovation performed by each ethnicity for
each ￿rm are calculated for each time period listed in Table 1. The years associated with each
period relate to the timing of patent applications. On average, slightly more than 50 patents
per ￿rm and time period are used to calculate these relative ethnic contributions.
2.2 Data on U.S. Multinational Firm Activity
Data on the activities of U.S. multinational ￿rms are drawn from the Survey of U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. direct investment
abroad is de￿ned as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a single U.S. legal entity of at
least 10% of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent
interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. A U.S. multinational ￿rm includes the
8In order to protect the con￿dentiality of the BEA data, to which the patent data are linked, the names of
these ￿rms are not identi￿ed.
7U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one
foreign business enterprise, called a foreign a¢ liate.9 The sample includes records drawn from
the 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 benchmark surveys. These surveys capture ￿nancial and
operating data for each foreign a¢ liate of each U.S. multinational, so it is possible to create a
panel of data on the assets, sales, employment, and employment compensation for each ￿rm in
each country. The BEA data also include information on the parent￿ s ownership share of each
a¢ liate, as well as the amount a¢ liates spend on R&D.
A number of steps were taken to link the data on U.S. multinationals with the data on
ethnic innovators. Data on the Committee on Uniform Security Identi￿cation Procedures codes
(CUSIPs) of employers of ethnic innovators were taken from the NBER Patent Citations Data
File and have been manually updated to assign patents to subsidiaries of major corporations and
to account for major mergers and acquisitions.10 These CUSIPs were matched with Employment
Identi￿cation Numbers (EINs) from Compustat. The BEA data include EINs, and an automated
merge was performed on the basis of these. Automated matches were manually con￿rmed and
augmented with a visual comparison of ￿rm names. One notable consequence of this process
is that the matched sample only includes publicly listed ￿rms because CUSIPs are used as the
starting point.
Much of the analysis below also aggregates the data on U.S. multinational ￿rm activity to the
￿rm-ethnicity-year level. This requires relating ethnicities to countries. There is a one-to-one
mapping of ethnicity and country for ￿ve cases. Chinese, European, and Hispanic ethnicities each
relate to more than one country. Chinese economies include Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao,
Singapore, and Taiwan. European economies include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Hispanic economies include Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
9As a result of con￿dentiality assurances and penalties for noncompliance, BEA believes that survey coverage
is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high. Mataloni (1995) and Mataloni and Yorgason (2002) provide
further details on these FDI data.
10Debbie Strumsky and Bill Lincoln performed portions of this update.
8Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The ￿nal sample has several limitations, but it o⁄ers broad coverage of U.S. multinational ac-
tivity nonetheless. The ￿rms only include publicly listed entities that have been granted patents
during the sample period and have a foreign a¢ liate. Anglo-Saxon innovators and multinational
activity in Anglo-Saxon countries are removed from the sample because such innovators are less
likely to be recent immigrants and to have distinctive ties to countries associated with their
ethnicity. Although it is not possible to identify ethnic names associated with many countries
like Thailand or Saudi Arabia, the aggregated data cover 45 foreign countries. The ￿nal sample
includes 641 ￿rms which account for more than two-thirds of aggregate foreign a¢ liate sales
in each of the locations associated with non-Anglo-Saxon ethnicities in each benchmark year.
Furthermore, these shares are higher in industries that intensively employ patenting. Table 2
presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis below.
3 Empirical Tests and Results
This section describes the empirical tests and presents the results. It contains three subsections.
The ￿rst presents analyses of the relation between the share of innovation performed by a partic-
ular ethnicity and the share of multinational a¢ liate activity that occurs in countries associated
with that ethnicity. The second, which includes two parts, explores the association between
ethnic innovation and the amount and location of innovative activity that U.S. multinationals
perform outside of the U.S. The third describes tests of whether U.S. multinationals own larger
shares of a¢ liates in countries that are of similar ethnicity to the ￿rms￿innovators.
3.1 Ethnic Innovation and Shares of Multinational A¢ liate Activity
One of the questions this paper seeks to address is whether U.S. based innovators of a particular
ethnicity bolster the expansion of U.S. multinational ￿rms in countries associated with that
ethnicity. Several tests shed light on this question by examining the relationship between the
share of innovation performed in the U.S. by a certain ethnicity and the subsequent share of
a¢ liate activity that occurs in the countries associated with the ethnicity of those inventors.
9The basic estimating equation takes the following form:
MNE%fet = ￿fe + ￿et + ￿ ￿ EI%fet + ￿fet: (1)
The observations employed in this test relate to a particular ￿rm for a particular ethnicity in
a particular year. MNE%fet is a measure of the share of ￿rm f￿ s foreign activity that occurs
in countries associated with ethnicity e in benchmark survey year t: Four measures of this
share are calculated using data on foreign a¢ liate assets, sales, employment, and employment
compensation. EI%fet measures the share of U.S. based innovation performed by individuals of
ethnicity e in the period leading up to benchmark survey year t: These periods span seven years
for the 1982 and 1989 benchmark years and ￿ve years for the 1994, 1999, and 2004 benchmark
years. ￿fe and ￿et are vectors of ￿rm-ethnicity and ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects. Standard errors
are clustered by ethnicity-year.
Several features of this speci￿cation are noteworthy. The ￿rm-ethnicity ￿xed e⁄ects remove
time invariant di⁄erences in the extent to which ￿rms invest in countries associated with a par-
ticular ethnicity and employ innovators of a particular ethnicity. The ￿ parameter is therefore
identi￿ed o⁄ of changes in these ￿rm characteristics over the sample period. A potential con-
cern is that there appear to be secular trends in the shares of innovation performed by certain
ethnicities, as indicated in Table 1, and these might coincide with secular trends in the growth
of a¢ liate activity. Including ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects addresses this concern. Finally, ￿rm-
speci￿c changes in the scale of activity could generate coincident changes in the levels of ethnic
innovation and multinational a¢ liate activity. Measuring ethnic innovation and the location of
multinational a¢ liate activity using shares, as opposed to levels, addresses this concern.
Table 3 presents results of tests using speci￿cation (1). The dependent variable in the ￿rst
column is the share of a¢ liate assets in countries associated with a particular ethnicity. The
0.1008 coe¢ cient in column 1 is statistically signi￿cant and implies that a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of innovation by individuals of a particular ethnicity is associated with a 1.0
percentage point increase in the share of multinational a¢ liate activity in countries related to
that ethnicity. Consistent results are obtained for other measures of the distribution of a¢ liate
10activity that are computed using data on sales, employment, and employment compensation, as
indicated in columns 2-4. Because the estimates that appear in columns 3 and 4 are of a similar
magnitude, the results suggest that changes in the share of ethnic innovation are not associated
with changes in the wage structures of foreign operations.
These basic results are robust to a variety of checks. They do not depend on the inclusion
of any particular ethnicity; the results hold dropping each of the ethnicities. They also do not
appear to be a consequence of activity in particular industries where patenting is especially
prevalent. Removing ￿rms that are primarily engaged in the production of pharmaceuticals or
other chemicals; audio, video and communication equipment; or computer and o¢ ce equipment
does not overturn the results. The measured relationships also do not seem to be driven by the
recent rapid growth in innovative activity by individuals of Chinese or Indian ethnicity; removing
observations related to the 2004 benchmark survey does not a⁄ect the results.
The ￿ndings in Table 3 suggest that innovation by individuals of a particular ethnicity
facilitates the expansion of U.S. multinationals in countries associated with that ethnicity. If
this interpretation is correct, one would expect U.S. based ethnic innovation to have particularly
large e⁄ects when ￿rms are beginning to engage in innovative activity in countries associated with
an ethnicity. U.S. based ethnic innovators could play a valuable role in promoting cooperation
between innovators working in di⁄erent locations and in identifying products and services that
could be further developed abroad to meet local demands. In order to identify such situations,
it is possible to use the patent data described above to isolate ￿rm-ethnicities for which the
￿rms had: 1) previously applied for patents for innovations of U.S. based inventors and 2)
subsequently applied for patents for innovations involving inventors located in countries of a
particular ethnicity. This sample is labeled the sample of new foreign innovators.
Table 4 presents the results of running speci￿cation (1) on two subsamples, the sample of new
foreign innovators and other observations. The top panel presents results for the new foreign
innovator sample, and the bottom panel presents results for other observations. The 0.2155
coe¢ cient on the Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents in the top panel is statistically signi￿cant and
11much larger than the 0.0551 insigni￿cant coe¢ cient on this variable in the bottom panel. The
larger coe¢ cient implies that, in this subsample, a 10 percentage point increase in the share
of innovation by individuals of a particular ethnicity is associated with a 2.2 percentage point
increase in the share of multinational a¢ liate activity in countries related to that ethnicity. A
similar pattern holds across the panels for the speci￿cations in columns 2-4. The results therefore
indicate that the association between U.S. based ethnic innovation and multinational a¢ liate
activity is more pronounced in situations where U.S. based ethnic innovations are arguably more
valuable to the ￿rms they work for.
An additional concern that can be raised about Table 3￿ s results is that they may re￿ ect
omitted variable bias or reverse causality. In particular, ￿rms might jointly make decisions
about the use of ethnic innovators and about where to expand internationally. Alternatively,
conducting FDI abroad may lead to identi￿cation of promising scientists and engineers that are
then brought to the U.S. to work. It is therefore desirable to create an alternative measure of
ethnic innovation that is more likely to exhibit exogenous variation.
One such measure can be computed using the patent data and is based on the initial distrib-
ution of ethnic innovation across U.S. cities for speci￿c ￿rms and the subsequent local growth of
ethnic innovation. This framework is based on the supply-push work of Card (2001), which has
also been applied by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) in a science
and engineering context. The identi￿cation builds o⁄ the fact that growth in the U.S. based
science and engineering workforce has di⁄ered across ethnicities, in part because of di⁄erences
in immigration patterns. For example, many Chinese innovators settle in San Francisco, while
many Hispanic innovators settle in Miami. The growth of Chinese scientists and engineers in
the U.S. is therefore more likely to in￿ uence ￿rms in San Francisco than ￿rms in Miami.
More speci￿cally, the Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents is computed by ￿rst calculating
ExpEIfet =
X
c
EIf;cet0
￿
EI￿f;cet0
EIcet0
￿
EI￿f;cet
EI￿f;cet0
+
EIf;cet0
EIcet0
￿
EI￿f;et
EI￿f;et0
￿
: (2)
The ￿rst term in the expression following the summation captures the initial distribution of
ethnic innovation for a ￿rm. It is the count of patents applied for by ￿rm f in which the
12inventor is based in city c and is of ethnicity e at time t0, which is the ￿rst benchmark year the
￿rm appears in the data. The analysis considers 281 cities de￿ned as Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, and Kerr (2010) lists major cities and their inventor shares.
The terms within the parentheses measure growth in patenting activity for ￿rms other than
￿rm f. Taking this approach increases the likelihood that this measure of ethnic innovation
is exogenous. For cities in which a single ￿rm is responsible for a large share of patenting
activity, growth in local patenting by ethnicity for other ￿rms can exhibit irregular properties.
Therefore, the terms in parentheses calculate growth rates using a weighted average of city-
speci￿c and national growth in ethnic patenting for other ￿rms. The two weights are captured
by
EI￿f;cet0
EIcet0 and
EIf;cet0
EIcet0 . These two weights sum to one, and the ￿rst is the share of the initial
patent counts attributable to ￿rms other than ￿rm f, while the second is the share attributable
to ￿rm f.
EI￿f;cet
EI￿f;cet0
is the local growth in patent applications ￿led by ￿rms other than ￿rm f for
patents in which the inventor is based in city c and is of ethnicity e in period t relative to t0.
EI￿f;et
EI￿f;et0
is a similar measure of growth, but it is measured across all cities and is not city speci￿c.
As such, city-speci￿c growth gets more weight when a ￿rm is responsible for a smaller share of
total innovative activity in the city.
The Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents is equal to ExpEIfet scaled by the total number
of patents that ￿rm f is expected to apply for in year t, and it is thus a predicted share for each
ethnicity in each period. The predicted share for an individual ethnicity in ￿rm f increases over
the sample period if the initially observed ethnic innovation of the ￿rm occurred in cities that
subsequently experienced strong in￿ ows of researchers of that ethnicity. The spatial distribution
of each ￿rm is held ￿xed at its initial level to avoid capturing ￿rms expanding into new cities to
take advantage of di⁄erential growth in innovation.
Table 5 presents the results of tests that make use of this alternative measure of ethnic in-
novation. As in the previous two tables, the speci￿cations presented include ￿rm-ethnicity and
ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects, and standard errors are clustered by ethnicity-year. It is noteworthy
that the ￿xed e⁄ects absorb the impact of di⁄erences in the initial distribution of ethnic innova-
13tion for a ￿rm as well as the aggregate growth trends of di⁄erent ethnicities. The identi￿cation
therefore comes from di⁄erences in the extent to which ￿rms were exposed to di⁄erent growth in
ethnic innovation across U.S. cities. The speci￿cation in the ￿rst column provides evidence that
the Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents is positively correlated with the Ethnic Share of U.S.
Patents. The 0.1926 coe¢ cient on the Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents indicates that the
two measures are closely related, but it is less than one, implying that factors besides growth in
ethnic innovation across cities in￿ uence how inventor compositions evolve in large ￿rms.
The dependent variables in the next four columns are the same ones considered in Table 3.
The coe¢ cients on Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents are positive in each of these speci￿-
cations, and in three of the four speci￿cations they have a similar or larger magnitude than the
coe¢ cients on the Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents reported in Table 3. The coe¢ cients are statis-
tically signi￿cant in columns 3 and 4. The ￿ndings indicate that changes in ethnic innovation
related to plausibly exogenous changes in the growth of ethnic innovation across U.S. cities are
associated with changes in the distribution of U.S. multinational a¢ liate sales and employment.
Therefore, these results alleviate some concerns about the potential endogeneity of the Ethnic
Share of U.S. Patents in Table 3. The tests are not perfect, as a forward-looking manager might
have located the ￿rm￿ s initial inventive facilities to attract innovators of a particular ethnicity
in anticipation of foreign expansion, for example. Nevertheless, this approach does show the
robustness of Table 3￿ s results to several endogeneity concerns.11
3.2 Ethnic Innovation and the Disintegration of Innovative Activity
Two pieces of analysis shed light on the role of ethnic innovators in breaking up innovative
activities across borders. The ￿rst piece examines a¢ liate R&D activity, and the second piece
considers the patenting of foreign innovations.
11It is possible to repeat the analysis that appears in Table 4 using the predicted ethnic share of U.S. patents
as the measure of ethnic innovation. Unreported results show that, as in the version of Table 4 that appears in
the paper, the coe¢ cients in the top panel are larger than those in the bottom panel, typically by a factor of
more than 2. The coe¢ cient on Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level
in the speci￿cation that explains the Share of Sales and uses the New Foreign Innovators subsample.
143.2.1 A¢ liate R&D Activity
Although U.S. multinationals perform a large share of their R&D within the U.S., this share
has been shrinking. According to the aggregate published BEA data, majority owned foreign
a¢ liates performed 6.4% of U.S. multinational R&D in 1982, but this ratio increased to 13.6%
in 2004. This globalization of R&D activities has received considerable recent attention in the
academic literature.12 While early foreign R&D e⁄orts focused on re￿ning products so they were
suitable for foreign markets and on accessing foreign technologies, recent e⁄orts also attempt
to tap into the large supply of foreign scientists and engineers regardless of their knowledge
of speci￿c foreign technologies.13 U.S. based ethnic innovators could be especially valuable in
facilitating the spread of inventive activity within ￿rms across countries.
Speci￿cations that take the following form shed light on this possibility:
ForeignR&Dfet = ￿fe + ￿et + ￿ ￿ ln(EIfet) + ￿fet: (3)
ForeignR&Dfet is a measure of the R&D conducted by ￿rm f in countries associated with
ethnicity e in benchmark year t. Like speci￿cation (1), this speci￿cation includes ￿rm-ethnicity
and ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects. Because the dependent variable does not measure the share of
R&D performed in countries of a particular ethnicity but instead captures the level of R&D
activity, the measure of ethnic innovation is not measured as a share either. ln(EIfet) is a
measure of the number of patents a ￿rm applies for in the period before the benchmark year for
which the inventor is based in the U.S. and is of ethnicity e. One concern that could be raised
about this approach is that ln(EIfet) might re￿ ect something about the overall scale of parent
activity. Growing ￿rms might increase employment of ethnic innovators and be more likely to
conduct R&D abroad. To address this possibility, tests include the log of one plus parent R&D
expenditures and the log of one plus parent sales.
Table 6 presents the results. The dependent variable used in the ￿rst four speci￿cations is
a dummy equal to one for ￿rms that conduct R&D in countries associated with a particular
12See, for example, Dalton et al. (1999), Freeman (2006), Zhao (2006), and Puga and Tre￿ er (2010).
13Studies of these issues include Niosi (1999), von Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002), Thursby and Thursby
(2006), and National Science Foundation (2010).
15ethnicity, and the dependent variable in the last four speci￿cations is the log of one plus the
value of those R&D expenditures. The coe¢ cients on the log of ethnic patenting are positive
and signi￿cant in the ￿rst two speci￿cations, the second of which includes controls for the scale
of parent activity. The 0.0396 coe¢ cient in column 2 implies that a one standard deviation
increase in the log of ethnic U.S. patents is associated with a 4.1 percentage point increase in
the likelihood of conducting R&D in countries associated with that ethnicity. This e⁄ect is
sizeable given that the mean likelihood that a ￿rm conducts R&D in countries associated with a
particular ethnicity is 38.4%, implying a relative increase of 10.6%. The speci￿cations in columns
5 and 6 repeat this analysis using the log of one plus foreign a¢ liate R&D expenditures, and
the coe¢ cients on the log of ethnic patenting variable are again positive and signi￿cant.14
As with the tests presented in Table 3, the tests in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 6 are
subject to concerns about omitted variable bias and reverse causality. It is possible to address
these concerns, in part, using the approach based on Card (2001) that is described above. The
variable Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) is calculated by computing ExpEIfet and then
taking the log of one plus this value. This alternative measure of ethnic patenting is used in
columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Table 6. It has a positive coe¢ cient in all four of these speci￿cations,
but the coe¢ cients are only statistically signi￿cant in the last two. These ￿ndings provide some
evidence that the results are not driven by omitted variable bias or reverse causation.15
Thus, the results in Table 6 indicate that U.S. based innovation by inventors of a certain
ethnicity facilitates R&D activity in countries associated with that ethnicity. Further evidence
of the manner in which ethnic innovators support the disintegration of inventive activity across
borders comes from the analysis of patent data.
14These results, along with those reported in Tables 7 and 8 that are discussed below, are robust to measuring
ethnic patenting as simply the log of the number of patents ￿led by inventors of a particular ethnicity or the
number of such patents winsorized at the 1% level in each tail.
15Some limitations of these tests are worth noting. The same concerns about forward-looking managers de-
scribed in the context of Table 5 appear here as well. In addition, if ￿rms locate operations in certain U.S. cities
and certain foreign countries that experience correlated rates of growth, the ￿ndings might re￿ ect this correlation
rather than a relationship between ethnic U.S. patenting and foreign R&D activity.
163.2.2 Patenting Foreign Inventions
If U.S. based ethnic innovators promote meaningful foreign R&D, this activity should result in
patents that list inventors located outside of the U.S. This speci￿cation tests this idea:
ForeignPatentfet = ￿fe + ￿et + ￿ ￿ ln(EIfet) + ￿fet: (4)
ForeignPatentfet is a measure of the extent to which ￿rm f applies for at least one patent in
which at least one inventor is based in a country associated with ethnicity e in the period that
precedes benchmark year t.16 Other variables are de￿ned as in speci￿cation (3). The sample
employed in this test di⁄ers from the samples used elsewhere because the BEA data are not
required in order to conduct it; therefore, the samples used here are somewhat larger. This
sample includes multinationals that report foreign pretax income in Compustat, and it is not
restricted to ￿rm-ethnicity observations where a foreign a¢ liate exists in the BEA data.
Table 7 shows the results of analysis that explains foreign patenting using speci￿cations like
the ones presented in Table 6. The coe¢ cients on the log of ethnic patenting are positive and
signi￿cant in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, indicating that an increase in innovation by U.S. based
inventors of a certain ethnicity is correlated with changes in the extent of innovative activity that
takes place in countries associated with that ethnicity. The coe¢ cients on the measure of ethnic
patenting generated using the approach based on Card (2001) are also positive and signi￿cant,
suggesting that the foreign patenting outcomes are robust to many endogeneity concerns. These
results are consistent with the previous ￿ndings on a¢ liate R&D activity. They suggest that
U.S. based ethnic inventors promote innovation activity abroad.
3.3 Ethnic Innovations and A¢ liate Ownership Structure
If innovators of a certain ethnicity facilitate the expansion of U.S. multinationals and innovative
activity in countries associated with that ethnicity, they might also be associated with distinct
ownership choices for new a¢ liates in those countries. Prior work on ownership structure points
16One concern that could be raised about this analysis is that ￿rms are not required to patent foreign innovations
in the U.S. The inclusion of parent ￿rm-ethnicity and ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects alleviates this concern as the
￿xed e⁄ects control for any systematic di⁄erences in patenting propensities on either of these dimensions.
17out that local partners can play a valuable role in supporting the activities of U.S. multina-
tionals abroad. Local partners often have valuable market information and local connections
that can help generate business. These bene￿ts of shared ownership are weighed against higher
coordination costs and considerations related to ceding control when multinational ￿rms make
ownership choices. Local partners typically hold larger ownership stakes when they bring more
value by playing a leadership role. However, a multinational that employs ethnic innovators
might have more con￿dence operating in host countries and might therefore cede less power
to such partners. Ethnic innovators can often provide both knowledge and connections that
facilitate foreign activity. These advantages are often cited as a key advantage that diasporas
confer. Therefore, ethnic innovators could enable U.S. multinationals to hold more control rights
in foreign a¢ liates by maintaining whole or majority ownership.
Speci￿cations that consider this possibility take the following form:
OWNayet = ￿ft + ￿ ￿ ln(EIfet) + ￿aet: (5)
The dependent variable measures the extent to which the parent owns the equity of a¢ liate a
located in country y associated with ethnicity e at time t. The analysis considers two measures
of ownership: a whole ownership dummy which is equal to one for a¢ liates that are wholly
owned by their parent, and a majority ownership dummy which is equal to one for a¢ liates
that are at least 50% owned by their parent. To isolate new a¢ liates, the sample only includes
a¢ liates the ￿rst time they appear in the BEA benchmark surveys, and a¢ liates that appeared
in the ￿rst survey in the sample, which occurred in 1982, are excluded. 80% of new a¢ liates are
wholly owned by their parents, and 92% of new a¢ liates are majority owned. ln(EIfet) is the
log of the count of the number of patents the ￿rm applies for in the period before benchmark
year t for which the inventor is based in the U.S. and is of ethnicity e.
The speci￿cations also include some controls. Several countries limit the ownership stake that
can be held by U.S. multinationals during the sample period. Speci￿cations include a measure
of these restrictions to capture their impact and to compare the relationship between restrictions
and ownership choices with the relationship between ethnic innovation and ownership choices.
18The Ownership Restriction Dummy is a dummy based on Shatz (2000), and it is equal to one
if both the acquisition and sectoral score are at least three in a particular country and year.
Prior work, including Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004), illustrates that a¢ liates that engage in
more trade with their parents are less likely to be minority owned. Speci￿cations include the
ratio of a¢ liate imports from their parents to a¢ liate sales and the ratio of a¢ liate exports to
their parents to a¢ liate sales as controls for this e⁄ect. The speci￿cation also includes parent-
year ￿xed e⁄ects ￿ft.17 The speci￿cations are linear probability models, and standard errors are
clustered by parent-year. The sample used in this analysis di⁄ers from that used in the analysis
in Tables 3-6 because each observation corresponds to a new a¢ liate, rather than to a ￿rm￿ s
activity in countries associated with a particular ethnicity.
The results of the speci￿cations appear in Table 8. The positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient in
the ￿rst column implies that ￿rms that have more innovation performed in the U.S. by inventors
of a certain ethnicity are more likely to wholly, as opposed to partially, own new a¢ liates in
countries associated with that ethnicity. The speci￿cation in the second column contains the
controls, including the ownership restriction dummy, which has a negative coe¢ cient, indicating
that ownership restrictions limit the use of whole ownership, as one might expect. The results in
column 2 imply that a one standard deviation decrease in ethnic innovation is associated with a
decrease in the use of whole ownership that is about two-thirds the size of the decrease associated
with ownership restrictions. Consistent with prior work, the coe¢ cients on the measures of
related party trade are positive and signi￿cant. This kind of trade appears to be easier to manage
between entities that are under common control. It is noteworthy that the speci￿cations do not
control for a¢ liate R&D activity. As a consequence, it is di¢ cult to rule out the possibility
that the relationship between the activities of ethnic innovators and ownership choice re￿ ects
concerns about the protection of intellectual property.18
17Previous speci￿cations include parent-ethnicity and ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects. There is not su¢ cient entry
within parent-ethnicities to identify e⁄ects when parent-ethnicity ￿xed e⁄ects are included. If ethnicity-year ￿xed
e⁄ects are included, there is little variation in ownership restriction within ethnicity-years, yielding results that
do not allow for a comparison of the relationship between ownership restrictions and ownership structure and
the relationship between ethnic innovation and ownership structure.
18The Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad does not collect R&D expenditure data from minority owned
a¢ liates, so it is not possible to include an a¢ liate measure of R&D expenditures in the tests. Furthermore, the
19Columns 3 and 4 present tests using the measure of ethnic patenting that is generated us-
ing the approach based on Card (2001), and the results are robust in these tests. The next
four columns present a similar analysis where the dependent variable is a dummy for the use
of majority ownership. The results are similar. Thus, ethnic innovators appear to allow U.S.
multinationals to serve countries without the assistance of a local partner. Using ethnic inno-
vators therefore likely increases the ability of multinationals to enjoy the coordination bene￿ts
that come with majority and whole ownership. These results support the view that high-skilled
ethnic employees possess knowledge and connections that aid ￿rms in navigating entry abroad.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the e⁄ects that ethnic scientists and engineers have on the global activities
of the ￿rms that employ them. The analysis uses detailed data on the names of inventors that
appear in patent applications to infer the ethnicity of U.S. based innovators. This information
is used in conjunction with detailed data on a¢ liates of U.S. multinationals.
Tests reveal that increases in the share of innovation performed by inventors of a certain
ethnicity are associated with increases in the share of a¢ liate activity in countries related to
that ethnicity. This result is stronger for ￿rms that are more likely to value ethnic innovators;
more speci￿cally, it is stronger when ￿rms are beginning to engage in innovative activity abroad,
and ethnic innovators could play a role in facilitating cooperation between innovators working
in di⁄erent locations and in identifying products and services that could be developed further
to meet foreign demands. This result also holds in tests that use a measure of ethnic innovation
that exhibits plausibly exogenous variation. This result implies that innovators of a particular
ethnicity facilitate the expansion of U.S. multinational ￿rms in countries associated with that
ethnicity, raising the conjecture that ethnic innovators enhance the competitiveness of U.S. ￿rms
in ethnic regions.
sample used in this analysis only includes new a¢ liates, and a¢ liates tend to conduct little or no R&D when
they are ￿rst established. However, it is possible to include an industry measure of R&D expenditures in these
tests. Doing so does not materially change the results.
20The data also illustrate that ￿rms with more innovative activity performed by U.S. based
inventors of a certain ethnicity are more likely to conduct R&D and to generate patents in
countries associated with that ethnicity. Recent literature points out that ￿rms are increasingly
breaking up innovative activities across countries to perform di⁄erent steps in settings where
they can be performed most e¢ ciently. The ￿ndings in this paper suggest that ethnic innovators
facilitate this change in the manner in which innovation occurs.
Finally, tests show that U.S. multinational ￿rms rely less on joint venture partners when
forming new a¢ liates in countries that are home to the ￿rms￿ethnic innovators. Joint ventures
typically entail substantial coordination costs and are subject to con￿ icts over transfer pricing
issues and technology transfers. Ethnic innovators appear to provide insights about foreign
markets that allow multinationals to majority or wholly own foreign a¢ liates.
References
Agrawal, Ajay, Iain Cockburn, and John McHale, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Knowledge Flows,
Labor Mobility, and Enduring Social Relationships", Journal of Economic Geography 6:5 (2006),
571-591.
Agrawal, Ajay, Devesh Kapur, John McHale, and Alexander Oettl, "Brain Drain or Brain Bank?
The Impact of Skilled Emigration on Poor-Country Innovation", Journal of Urban Economics
69 (2011), 43-55.
Alcacer, Juan, and Wilbur Chung, "Location Strategies and Knowledge Spillovers", Management
Science 53:5 (2007), 760-776.
Alcacer, Juan, and Minyuan Zhao, "Local R&D Strategies and Multi-location Firms: The Role
of Internal Linkages", Management Science (2011), forthcoming.
Almeida, Paul, and Bruce Kogut, "Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in
Regional Networks", Management Science 45:7 (1999), 905-917.
Arora, Ashish, and Alfonso Gambardella, From Underdogs to Tigers? The Rise and Growth
of the Software Industry in Brazil, China, India, Ireland, and Israel, (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
Balakrishnan, Srinivasan, and Mitchell Koza, "Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection and
Joint-Ventures: Theory and Evidence", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 20 (1993),
99-117.
Bhattacharya, Utpal, and Peter Groznik, "Melting Pot or Salad Bowl: Some Evidence from U.S.
Investments Abroad", Journal of Financial Markets 11:3 (2008), 228-258.
Branstetter, Lee, "Is Foreign Direct Investment a Channel of Knowledge Spillovers? Evidence
from Japan￿ s FDI in the United States", Journal of International Economics 68 (2006), 325-344.
Buch, Claudia, J￿rn Kleinert, and Farid Toubal, "Where Enterprises Lead, People Follow? Links
Between Migration and German FDI", European Economic Review 50:8 (2006), 2017-2036.
Card, David, "Immigrant In￿ ows, Native Out￿ ows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of
Higher Immigration", Journal of Labor Economics 19:1 (2001), 22-64.
21Choudhury, Prithwiraj, "Internal Labor Markets and Knowledge Creation in Multinationals",
Working Paper (2010).
Clemens, Michael, "Skill Flow: A Fundamental Reconsideration of Skilled-Worker Migration
and Development", United Nations Human Development Report (2009).
Dalton, D.H., M.G. Serapio, and P.G. Yoshida. Globalizing Industrial Research and Development
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Technology Administration, 1999).
Desai, Mihir, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr., "The Costs of Shared Ownership: Evidence
from International Joint Ventures", Journal of Financial Economics 73:2 (2004), 323-374.
Docquier, FrØdØric, and Elisabetta Lodigiani, "Skilled Migration and Business Networks", Open
Economies Review 21:4 (2010), 565-588.
Docquier, FrØdØric, and Hillel Rapoport, "The Economics of the Brain Drain", Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, forthcoming (2011).
Freeman, Richard, "People Flows in Globalization", Journal of Economic Perspectives 20:2
(2006), 145-170.
Gould, David, "Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implications for U.S. Bilateral
Trade Flows", Review of Economics and Statistics 76 (1994), 302-316.
Government of India, The High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2001),
http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm.
Griliches, Zvi, "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey", Journal of Economic
Literature 28:4 (1990), 1661-1707.
Hatzigeorgiou, Andreas, and Magnus Lodefalk, "Trade and Migration: Firm-Level Evidence",
Working Paper (2011).
Hall, Bronwyn, Adam Ja⁄e, and Manuel Trajtenberg, "The NBER Patent Citation Data File:
Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools", NBER Working Paper 8498 (2001).
Head, Keith, and John Ries, "Immigration and Trade Creation: Econometric Evidence from
Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics 31:1 (1998), 47-62.
Hernandez, Exequiel, "Immigrant Social Capital and Firm Strategic Heterogeneity: E⁄ects on
Foreign Entry and Firm Performance", Working Paper (2011).
Hovhannisyan, Nune, and Wolfgang Keller, "International Business Travel: An Engine of Inno-
vation?", Working Paper (2010).
Huang, Yasheng, Li Jin, and Yi Qian, "Does Ethnicity Pay? Evidence from Overseas Chinese
FDI in China", Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming (2011).
Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, "How Much Does Immigration Boost Innova-
tion?", American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2 (2010), 31-56.
Iriyama, Akie, Yong Li, and Ravi Madhavan, "Spiky Globalization of Venture Capital Invest-
ments: The In￿ uence of Prior Human Networks", Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 4 (2010),
128-145.
Javorcik, Beata, ˙a… glar ￿zden, Mariana Spatareanu, and Cristina Neagu, "Migrant Networks
and Foreign Direct Investment", Journal of Development Economics 94:2 (2011), 231-241.
Keller, Wolfgang, "International Technology Di⁄usion", Journal of Economic Literature 42:3
(2004), 752-782.
Kerr, William, "The Ethnic Composition of US Inventors", HBS Working Paper 08-006 (2007).
22Kerr, William, "Ethnic Scienti￿c Communities and International Technology Di⁄usion", Review
of Economics and Statistics 90:3 (2008), 518-537.
Kerr, William, "Heterogeneous Technology Di⁄usion and Ricardian Trade Patterns", HBS Work-
ing Paper (2009).
Kerr, William, "The Agglomeration of US Ethnic Inventors", in Edward Glaeser (ed.) Economics
of Agglomeration (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
Kerr, William, and William Lincoln, "The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and
U.S. Ethnic Invention", Journal of Labor Economics 28:3 (2010), 473-508.
Kugler, Maurice, and Hillel Rapoport, "International Labor and Capital Flows: Complements
or Substitutes?", Economics Letters 92:2 (2007), 155-162.
Kugler, Maurice, and Hillel Rapoport, "Migration, FDI and the Margins of Trade", Working
Paper (2011).
MacGarvie, Megan, "The Determinants of International Knowledge Di⁄usion as Measured by
Patent Citations", Economics Letters 87:1 (2005), 121-126.
MacGarvie, Megan, "Foreign Students and the Di⁄usion of Scienti￿c and Technological Knowl-
edge to and from American Universities", Working Paper (2006).
Mataloni, Raymond, "A Guide to BEA Statistics on U.S. Multinational Companies", Survey of
Current Business 75 (1995).
Mataloni, Raymond, and Daniel Yorgason, "Operations of U.S. Multinational Companies", Sur-
vey of Current Business 82 (2002).
Nachum, Lilach, "But How Does Distance A⁄ect FDI? And Why Does It Matter?" Working
Paper (2011).
Nachum, Lilach, Srilata Zaheer, and Shulamith Gross, "Does it Matter Where Countries Are?
Proximity to Knowledge, Markets and Resources, and MNE Location Choices", Management
Science 54:7 (2008), 1252-1265.
Nanda, Ramana, and Tarun Khanna, "Diasporas and Domestic Entrepreneurs: Evidence from
the Indian Software Industry", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 19:4 (2010),
991-1012.
National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators (Arlington, VA: National Sci-
ence Board, 2010).
Niosi, Jorge, "The Internationalization of Industrial R&D: From Technology Transfer to the
Learning Organization", Research Policy 28 (1999), 107-117.
Oettl, Alexander, and Ajay Agrawal, "International Labor Mobility and Knowledge Flow Ex-
ternalities", Journal of International Business Studies 39:8 (2008), 1242-1260.
Papageorgiou, Chris, and Antonio Spilimbergo, "Learning Abroad and Technology Adoption",
Working Paper (2008).
Puga, Diego, and Daniel Tre￿ er, "Wake Up and Smell the Ginseng: The Rise of Incremental
Innovation in Low-Wage Countries", Journal of Development Economics 91:1 (2010), 64-76.
Rangan, Subramanian, and Aldemir Drummond, "The Problem of Control and the Role of
Home￿ Host Ties in Explaining Multinationals￿Foreign Operations, Competitiveness, and Per-
formance", Global Strategy Journal 1 (2011), 362-376.
Rangan, Subramanian, and Metin Sengul, "The In￿ uence of Macro Structure on the Foreign
Market Performance of Transnational Firms: The Value of IGO Connections, Export Depen-
dence, and Immigration Links", Administrative Science Quarterly 54 (2009), 229-267.
23Rauch, James, "Networks Versus Markets in International Trade", Journal of International
Economics 48:1 (1999), 7-35.
Rauch, James, "Business and Social Networks in International Trade", Journal of Economic
Literature 39:4 (2001), 1177-1203.
Rauch, James, and Vitor Trindade, "Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade", Review
of Economics and Statistics 84:1 (2002), 116-130.
Rosenkopf, Lori, and Paul Almeida, "Overcoming Local Search through Alliances and Mobility",
Management Science 49:6 (2003), 751-766.
Saxenian, AnnaLee, "Silicon Valley￿ s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs", (San Francisco, CA: Pub-
lic Policy Institute of California, 1999).
Saxenian, AnnaLee, The New Argonauts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
Saxenian, AnnaLee, "Transnational Communities and the Evolution of Global Production Net-
works: Taiwan, China and India", Industry and Innovation 9:3 (2002).
Saxenian, AnnaLee, with Yasuyuki Motoyama and Xiaohong Quan, Local and Global Networks
of Immigrant Professionals in Silicon Valley (San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of
California, 2002).
Shatz, Howard, "The Location of U.S. Multinational A¢ liates", Harvard Dissertation (2000).
Singh, Jasjit, "Multinational Firms and International Knowledge Di⁄usion: Evidence from
Patent Citation Data", Best Paper Proceedings of the Academy of Management (2004).
Singh, Jasjit, "Collaborative Networks as Determinants of Knowledge Di⁄usion Patterns", Man-
agement Science 51:5 (2005), 756-770.
Singh, Jasjit, "Asymmetry of Knowledge Spillovers between MNCs and Host Country Firms",
Journal of International Business Studies 38:5 (2007), 764-786.
Singh, Jasjit, "Distributed R&D, Cross-Regional Knowledge Integration and Quality of Innova-
tive Output", Research Policy 37:1 (2008), 77-96.
Thursby Jerry, and Marie Thursby, Here or There? A Survey on the Factors in Multinational
R&D Location (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006).
Veugelers, Reinhilde, and Bruno Cassiman, "Foreign Subsidiaries as a Channel of International
Technology Di⁄usion: Some Direct Firm Level Evidence from Belgium", European Economic
Review 48:2 (2004), 455-476.
von Zedtwitz, Maximilian, and Oliver Gassmann, "Market versus Technology Drive in R&D
Internationalization: Four Di⁄erent Patterns of Managing Research and Development", Research
Policy 31 (2002), 569-588.
Zhao, Minyaun, "Conducting R&D in Countries with Weak Intellectual Property Rights Pro-
tection", Management Science 56:7 (2006), 1185-1199.
Zhao, Minyaun, and Mazhar Islam, "Cross-Regional Ties within Firms: Promoting Knowledge
Flow or Discouraging Knowledge Spillover", Working Paper (2011).
24Anglo-
Saxon
Chinese European Hispanic Indian Japanese Korean Russian Viet-
namese
1975-1982 81.3% 2.8% 8.3% 2.8% 2.5% 0.6% 0.5% 1.2% 0.1%
1983-1989 78.5% 4.2% 7.8% 2.9% 3.5% 0.7% 0.6% 1.5% 0.2%
1990-1994 76.4% 5.4% 7.3% 3.4% 4.2% 0.6% 0.6% 1.6% 0.5%
1995-1999 72.8% 7.3% 6.5% 3.7% 5.8% 0.7% 0.7% 1.7% 0.7%
2000-2004 68.0% 9.5% 6.2% 4.0% 7.3% 1.0% 1.1% 2.2% 0.8%
Chemicals 74.1% 6.6% 8.1% 3.5% 4.5% 0.7% 0.8% 1.4% 0.3%
Computers 70.7% 7.7% 6.3% 3.5% 7.3% 0.9% 0.7% 2.1% 0.8%
Pharmaceuticals 74.9% 6.0% 7.5% 4.2% 4.1% 0.7% 0.7% 1.4% 0.3%
Electrical 73.2% 7.2% 7.0% 3.2% 5.0% 0.9% 0.8% 1.9% 0.7%
Mechanical 81.3% 2.8% 7.6% 2.9% 2.8% 0.5% 0.5% 1.4% 0.2%
Miscellaneous 81.3% 3.2% 7.2% 3.1% 2.7% 0.5% 0.4% 1.3% 0.3%
Table 1
Ethnic Shares of Patenting Activity
Ethnicity of Inventors
Notes:  This table presents the share of patents in which inventors are of particular ethnicities, reside in the U.S. at the time of 
patent application, and work for a publicly listed corporation.  Inventor ethnicities are estimated through inventors' names using 
techniques described in the text.  Patents are grouped by application years and major technology fields.Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Asset Share 0.1899 0.2339
Sales Share 0.1945 0.2251
Employment Share 0.1959 0.2294
Employment Compensation Share 0.1944 0.2363
Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents 0.0403 0.0521
Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents 0.0473 0.0681
Foreign R&D Dummy 0.3840 0.4864
Log (1 + Foreign R&D) 2.8022 3.8189
Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) (Table 6) 0.8960 1.0293
Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) (Table 6) 0.9457 1.1156
Log (1 + Parent R&D Expenditures) 10.7375 2.9150
Log (1 + Parent Sales) 14.6533 1.6093
Foreign Patenting Dummy 0.0838 0.2772
Log (1 + Foreign Patents) 0.1338 0.5466
Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) (Table 7) 0.4755 0.8342
Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) (Table 7) 0.4916 0.8689
Log (1 + Firm R&D) 3.5147 1.7845
Log (1 + Firm Sales) 6.9092 1.8932
Whole Ownership Dummy 0.7963 0.4028
Majority Ownership Dummy 0.9205 0.2705
Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) (Table 8) 1.5305 1.3122
Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) (Table 8) 1.7048 1.5559
Ownership Restriction Dummy 0.2455 0.4304
Ratio of Imports from Parent to Sales 0.0893 0.2185
Ratio of Exports to Parent to Sales 0.0283 0.1323
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Notes: Asset Share, Sales Share, Employment Share, and Employment Compensation Share capture the share of affiliate activity that occurs in 
countries associated with a particular ethnicity.  Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents measures the firm's share of patents that cover inventions that 
occurred in the U.S. and were filed by inventors of a particular ethnicity.  Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents is calculated by using the spatial 
distribution of a firm's initial inventor activity across cities and subsequent city-by-city growth of ethnic inventor populations.  Foreign R&D 
Dummy is a dummy equal to one for firms that incur R&D expenditures within countries associated with a particular ethnicity.  Log (1 + Foreign 
R&D) is the log of one plus the value of R&D expenditures incurred within countries associated with a particular ethnicity.  Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. 
Patents) is the log of one plus the number of patents that cover inventions that occurred in the U.S. and were filed by inventors of a particular 
ethnicity. Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) is calculated by using the spatial distribution of a firm's initial inventor activity across cities and 
subsequent city-by-city growth of ethnic inventor populations.  The Table 6 measures of these variables are computed at the parent-ethnicity-year 
level where both ethnic patenting and affiliate activity exist, the Table 7 measures are computed at the parent-ethnicity-year level where ethnic 
patenting exists, and the Table 8 measures are computed at the affiliate level.  Log (1 + Parent R&D Expenditures) and Log (1 + Parent Sales) 
respectively measure the log of one plus the domestic R&D expenditures and sales of a parent firm.  Foreign Patenting Dummy is a dummy 
variable equal to one for firms that apply for at least one patent in which at least one inventor is based in a country associated with a particular 
ethnicity in the years preceding a benchmark survey year, and Log (1 + Foreign Patents) is the log of one plus the number of these patents.  Log (1 
+ Firm R&D) and Log (1 + Firm Sales) are, respectively, the log of one plus firm R&D expenditures and sales as measured in Compustat.  Whole 
Ownership Dummy is a dummy equal to one for new affiliates that are wholly owned by their parent firms and zero for other new affiliates, and 
Majority Ownership Dummy is a dummy equal to one for new affiliates that are at least 50% owned by their parent firms and zero for other new 
affiliates.  Ownership Restriction Dummy is based on Shatz (2000), and it is equal to one if both the acquisition and sectoral score are at least three 
in a particular country and year.  Ratio of Imports from Parent to Sales is the ratio of affiliate imports from the U.S. parent to affiliate sales, and 
Ratio of Exports to Parent Sales is the ratio of affiliate exports to the U.S. parent to affiliate sales. Dollar amounts for BEA data are measured in 
thousands of dollars; dollar amounts for Compustat data  are measured in millions of dollars.Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents 0.1008** 0.0772** 0.0733* 0.0794**
(0.0413) (0.0324) (0.0404) (0.0297)
Parent Firm x Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,474 5,475 5,472 5,472
Table 3
Affiliate Activity in Countries Associated with an Ethnicity
Notes:  The dependent variables capture the share of affiliate activity that occurs in countries associated with a particular 
ethnicity.  The four columns respectively measure this share using affiliate assets, sales, employment levels, and 
employment compensation, and the data used to compute these variables cover the years 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004.  
Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents measures the share of a firm's patents that cover inventions that occurred in the U.S. and were 
filed by inventors of a particular ethnicity.  U.S. ethnic patenting shares are computed using data from the five years prior to 
the shares of affiliate activity, except in the cases of 1982 and 1989 when seven-year time spans are used.  All non-Anglo-
Saxon ethnicities are included.  The specifications are OLS specifications that include fixed effects for each parent firm-
ethnicity and for each ethnicity-year.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the ethnicity-
year level appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Foreign Affiliate Activity
Share of 
Employment
Share of 
Employment 
Compensation
Share of Assets Share of SalesDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents 0.2155** 0.2547*** 0.1541* 0.2491***
(0.0991) (0.0852) (0.0886) (0.0653)
Parent Firm x Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,200 2,201 2,200 2,200
Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents 0.0551 0.0084 0.0387 -0.0018
(0.0550) (0.0458) (0.0560) (0.0481)
Parent Firm x Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,274 3,274 3,272 3,272
Notes:  This table presents specifications like those in Table 3 for two subsamples.  The New Foreign Innovators sample 
isolates firm-ethnicities for which the firms had: 1) previously applied for patents for innovations of U.S. based inventors 
and 2) subsequently applied for patents for innovations involving inventors located in countries of a particular ethnicity. The 
Other Observations sample includes other observations. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
Table 4
Affiliate Activity in Countries Associated with an Ethnicity
A. New Foreign Innovators
B. Other Observations
Foreign Affiliate Activity: New Foreign Innovators
Share of 
Employment
Share of 
Employment 
Compensation
Share of Assets Share of SalesDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.1926** 0.0403 0.1540** 0.1492** 0.0713
(0.0717) (0.0628) (0.0607) (0.0647) (0.0577)
Parent Firm x Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,475 5,474 5,475 5,472 5,472
Table 5
Affiliate Activity in Countries Associated with an Ethnicity
Notes:  The first column presents the relationship between the predicted and actual values of the ethnic share of U.S. patents.  The dependent 
variables in the remaining columns capture the share of affiliate activity that occurs in countries associated with a particular ethnicity.  Columns 2-5 
respectively measure this share using affiliate assets, sales, employment levels, and employment compensation, and the data used to compute these 
variables cover the years 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004.  Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. Patents measures the expected share of patents that 
cover inventions that occurred in the U.S. and were filed by inventors of a particular ethnicity.  These shares are calculated by combining the 
spatial distribution of a firm's initial inventor activity across cities with subsequent city-by-city growth of ethnic inventor populations.  Own-firm 
inventors are removed from the city growth through a procedure discussed in the text.   All non-Anglo-Saxon ethnicities are included.  
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the ethnicity-year level appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Foreign Affiliate Activity: Predicted Share Estimates
Predicted Ethnic Share of U.S. 
Patents
Share of Assets Share of Sales
Share of 
Employment
Share of 
Employment 
Compensation
Ethnic Share of 
U.S. PatentsDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) 0.0635*** 0.0396** 0.5571*** 0.3081**
(0.0152) (0.0166) (0.1262) (0.1461)
0.0242 0.0199 0.2900** 0.2744**
(0.0148) (0.0169) (0.1210) (0.1253)
0.0077** 0.0082** 0.0856*** 0.0891***
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0222) (0.0225)
Log (1 + Parent Sales) 0.0565*** 0.0693*** 0.5848*** 0.6873***
(0.0138) (0.0149) (0.1125) (0.1074)
Parent Firm x Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,476 5,345 5,476 5,345 5,476 5,345 5,476 5,345
Notes:  The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a dummy equal to one for firms that incur R&D expenditures within countries associated with a particular ethnicity, and it is 
measured in 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004.  In columns 5-8 the dependent variable is the log of one plus the value of R&D expenditures incurred by a firm within countries 
associated with a particular ethnicity.  Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) is the log of one plus the parent firm's number of patents that cover inventions that occurred in the U.S. and 
were filed by inventors of a particular ethnicity.  It is computed using data from the five years prior to the R&D measures, except in the cases of 1982 and 1989 when seven-year 
time spans are used.  Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) is calculated by combining the spatial distribution of a firm's initial inventor activity across cities with subsequent 
city-by-city growth of ethnic inventor populations. Log (1 + Parent R&D Expenditures) and Log (1 + Parent Sales) respectively measure the log of one plus the domestic R&D 
expenditures and sales of a parent firm.  All non-Anglo-Saxon ethnicities are included.  The specifications are OLS specifications that include fixed effects for each parent firm-
ethnicity and for each ethnicity-year.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the ethnicity-year level appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Foreign R&D Dummy
Log (1 + Parent R&D Expenditures)
Log (1 + Foreign R&D)
Table 6
Foreign Affiliate R&D
Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents)Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) 0.0790*** 0.0725*** 0.2085*** 0.2167***
(0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0248) (0.0244)
0.0354*** 0.0341*** 0.1440*** 0.1469***
(0.0092) (0.0086) (0.0236) (0.0236)
Log (1 + Firm R&D) 0.0083 0.0288*** 0.0033 0.0628***
(0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0097) (0.0132)
Log (1 + Firm Sales) -0.0007 0.0020 -0.0181 -0.0078
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0094) (0.0082)
Parent Firm x Ethnicity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,200 10,056 11,200 10,056 11,200 10,056 11,200 10,056
Foreign Patenting Dummy Log (1 + Foreign Patents)
Notes:  The dependent variable in columns 1-4  is a dummy variable equal to one for firms that apply for at least one patent in which at least one inventor is based in a country 
associated with a particular ethnicity in the years preceding a benchmark survey year.  The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the log of one plus the number of such patents 
that a firm applies for.  Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) is the log of one plus the parent firm's number of patents that cover inventions that occurred in the U.S. and were filed by 
inventors of a particular ethnicity. Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) is calculated by combining the spatial distribution of a firm's initial inventor activity across cities with 
subsequent city-by-city growth of ethnic inventor populations. Log (1 + Firm R&D Expenditures) and Log (1 + Firm Sales) respectively measure the log of one plus the R&D 
expenditures and sales of a firm as measured in Compustat in millions of dollars.  All non-Anglo-Saxon ethnicities are included.  The specifications are OLS specifications that 
include fixed effects for each parent firm-ethnicity and for each ethnicity-year.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the ethnicity-year level 
appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Table 7
Patenting Foreign Inventions
Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents)Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) 0.0833*** 0.0708*** 0.0499*** 0.0543***
(0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0151) (0.0191)
0.0673*** 0.0727*** 0.0493*** 0.0649***
(0.0112) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0164)
Ownership Restriction Dummy -0.1479*** -0.1541*** -0.0523*** -0.0544***
(0.0239) (0.0229) (0.0190) (0.0182)
0.1274*** 0.1295*** 0.0714*** 0.0750***
(0.0349) (0.0350) (0.0253) (0.0253)
0.1135** 0.1139** 0.0595** 0.0606**
(0.0463) (0.0469) (0.0298) (0.0300)
Parent Firm x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,971 4,244 6,971 4,244 6,971 4,244 6,971 4,244
Ratio of Imports from Parent to Sales
Table 8
Foreign Affiliate Ownership Structure
Whole Ownership Dummy Majority Ownership Dummy
Notes:  The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a dummy equal to one for new affiliates that are wholly owned by their parent firms and zero for other new affiliates, and the 
dependent variable in columns 5-8 is a dummy equal to one for new affiliates that are at least 50% owned by their parent firms and zero for other new affiliates.   New affiliates 
are identified in the years 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 as affiliates that were not present in the previous benchmark survey.  Log (1 + Ethnic U.S. Patents) is the log of one plus 
the parent firm's number of patents that cover inventions that occurred in the U.S. and were filed by inventors of a particular ethnicity.  It is computed using data from the five 
years prior to the ownership measures, except in the case of 1989 when a seven-year time span is used.  Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents) is calculated by combining the 
spatial distribution of a firm's initial inventor activity across cities with subsequent city-by-city growth of ethnic inventor populations. The Ownership Restriction Dummy is based 
on Shatz (2000), and it is equal to one if both the acquisition and sectoral score are at least three in a particular country and year.  Ratio of Imports from Parent to Sales is the 
ratio of affiliate imports from the U.S. parent to affiliate sales, and Ratio of Exports to Parent Sales is the ratio of affiliate exports to the U.S. parent to affiliate sales. All non-
Anglo-Saxon ethnicities are included.  The specifications are OLS specifications that include fixed effects for each parent firm-year.   Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors that correct for clustering at the parent firm-year level appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Log (1 + Predicted Ethnic U.S. Patents)
Ratio of Exports to Parent to Sales